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ABSTRACT 
 
Municipal mergers have been widely used as a tool for administrative reform (Fox and Gurley-
Calvez 2006; OECD 2014). While municipal mergers have been planned or implemented with the 
hope of increasing efficiencies in service provisions, their impacts on local democracy have been 
neglected (Hansen 2013, 2015; Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010). In particular, little is known 
as to how mergers affect performance of local legislatures. In filling these gaps, this study uses a 
dataset of 754 Japanese city-level governments from 2008 to 2014 to examine how mergers influ-
ence legislative performance. After controlling for potential confounding factors, the analysis shows 
that municipal merger is negatively correlated to legislative performance. Specifically, new local 
councils created through merger are less likely to propose municipal bylaws than non-merged 
councils. This study contributes to the existing studies by examining the neglected dimension of 
merger effects in an understudied Asian developed country: Japanese local governments.  
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Introduction 
Scholars in the field of public administration and urban affairs have investigated how mergers of 
municipalities affect their performance (Allers and Geertsema 2016; Dollery, Byrnes, and Crase 
2007; Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010; Reingewertz 2012; Steiner and Kaiser 2016; Suzuki and 
Sakuwa 2016). Municipal mergers have been carried out in many developed countries mainly for 
the purpose of increasing efficiency in the provision of municipal service and spending (Fox and 
Gurley-Calvez 2006; OECD 2014). However, what has been often neglected is their impacts on 
local democracy (Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz 2016). Although previous studies examine how mer-
gers affect citizens’ political interest and efficacy (Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Steiner and Kaiser 
2016), political trust (Hansen 2013), and satisfaction with local government (Hansen 2015), very 
few studies assess the relationship between mergers and legislature performance. Kjaer, Hjelmar, 
and Leth Olsen (2010) is the single study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, that examines the 
impacts of mergers on local legislative activity. However, the study mainly relies on subjective per-
ceptions of local councilors regarding their influences on policy making based on survey data. We 
still do not know how mergers affect actual performance of local legislatures, such as the proposal 
and passage of bills. By shedding light on this relatively neglected aspect of merger effects, this 
study seeks to fill this gap in the literature and contribute to the literature on local government size 
and performance (Andrews and Boyne 2009; Avellaneda and Gomes 2015; Christenson and Sachs 
1980; Boyne 1996; Newton 1982) as well as studies of municipal consolidation (Allers and 
Geertsema 2016; Dollery, Byrnes, and Crase 2007; Andrews 2013; Holzer et al. 2009; Drew, Kortt, 
and Dollery 2014; Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010; Reingewertz 2012; Steiner and Kaiser 
2016). 
 
Municipal mergers have been widely used as a tool for administrative reform at the municipal level 
in developed countries. By combining two or more municipalities, mergers reduce the number of 
total municipalities and increase their scale in terms of geography and population. Generally, the 
main purpose of merging municipalities is to build more efficient and effective local governments 
with greater administrative capacities by consolidating fragmented municipalities. While municipal 
fragmentation has been pursued often in developing countries, mergers through the consolidation 
of municipal bodies are more common in developed countries (Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006; 
OECD 2014). While the promoters of consolidation often emphasize the merger’s benefits of in-
creasing efficiency or effectiveness through greater economies of scale or economies of scope, they 
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often overlook its drawbacks such as the negative impacts on local democracy. Mergers may im-
prove efficiency in municipal spending and service delivery by the administrative body. Such a re-
structuring, however, may not always be beneficial for legislative activities of local councils in the 
short run because of 1) reduced citizen interest and participation in politics and lower satisfaction 
with local governments in bigger municipalities (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Hansen 2013, 2015; Lassen 
and Serritzlew 2011; Mouritzen 1989; Newton 1982); 2) reduction in councilor-citizen proximity in 
merged municipalities (Newton 1982); 3) increased bureaucratic professionalization and specializa-
tion (Carr and Feiock 1999; Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006; Vojnovic 2000; Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth 
Olsen 2010); and 4) the negative impact of profound organizational change on performance(Bhatti, 
Gørtz, and Pedersen 2015; Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron 2001).  
 
This study tests the impacts of municipal mergers on local legislative performance by using a da-
taset of 754 post-merger Japanese municipalities from 2008 to 2014. The central government of 
Japan carried out a nationwide municipal merger reform from 1999 to 2006. Due to the unavailabil-
ity of legislative data before 2007, this study relies only on the post-merger data. Two dimensions of 
legislative activities are tested: legislative proposal and approval. Each dimension is operationalized 
by local councils’ 1) revisions to mayors’ legislative proposals, and 2) proposals for municipal by-
laws. After controlling for potential confounding factors, the analysis shows that municipal merger 
discourages legislative activity. Results suggest that merger is negatively associated with bylaw pro-
posal by local councils. Councils experiencing merger propose fewer municipal bylaws.  
 
This research contributes to the existing studies of municipal merger and administrative reforms in 
several ways. First, while there have been a number of extensive studies on the impacts of merger 
reform on financial efficiency, there have been few studies that explore how municipal mergers 
affect the dimensions of local democracy. In particular, studies that assess the impact of municipal 
boundary rescaling on performance of local legislatures are still scarce.  Second, by testing under-
studied aspects of municipal performance using objective performance data of legislatures this 
study contributes to the existing studies on municipal size and performance. More specifically, by 
testing two dimensions of legislative performance (legislation proposal and approval), this research 
explores whether the effects of merger vary across two dimensions. Third, regarding merger effects 
on democracy, most previous studies rely heavily on merger cases in European countries (Kjaer, 
Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010; Hansen 2013; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Hansen 2015; Steiner 
and Kaiser 2016). This study contributes to the recent increased interest in contextual factors in 
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public management and performance in a cross-national setting (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 
2017; O’Toole and Meier 2014) by investigating a relatively understudied developed democratic 
setting: Japanese local governments.  
 
This study is organized into five sections. The first section reviews what has been studied about the 
impacts of municipal mergers and the relationship between municipal size and local democracy, and 
provides the rationale for testing the merger effects on legislative performance by local councils. 
The second section provides background information on municipal mergers and legislative activi-
ties of local councils in Japan. The third section describes the research design and variable opera-
tionalization, followed by a fourth section containing results and analysis. The fifth section presents 
conclusions and limitations of this research. 
 
Municipal Merger and Legislative Performance of Local Councils 
Municipal merger/consolidation/amalgamation is one type of administrative and structural reform 
of municipalities, whose implementation can be either mandatory or voluntary. Consolidation 
means “[t]he action or process of combining a number of things into a single more effective or 
coherent whole” (Oxford University Press 2016). In other words, the number of municipalities is 
reduced by combining two or more municipalities. The resulting consolidated units will be enlarged 
municipalities in terms of area and population. While transitional economies have generally opted 
for fragmentation (Avellaneda and Gomes, 2015), municipal amalgamation has been common in 
developed countries such as Australia, Denmark, Finland, the United States, and Japan. In fact, half 
of OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries have planned or 
implemented municipal consolidations in the last 15 years (OECD 2014). i 
 
The promoters of consolidation contend that aggregating small units improves service coordination 
and produces economies of scale or scope (Christenson and Sachs 1980; Hirsch 1968; Lomax 1952; 
Shepherd 1990; Whetten 1978). These arguments assert that larger organizations (1) have greater 
control over the external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978); (2) spread administrative costs 
across a larger set of services (Stigler 1958); (3) avoid administrative duplication (Andrews and 
Boyne 2009; Lomax 1952); and (4) lower input prices through their greater purchasing power (An-
drews and Boyne 2009). Therefore, municipal consolidation should lead to eﬃciency in administra-
tive/operational costs.  
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One significant criticism against municipal merger has been raised from the perspective of local 
democracy. The ancient Greeks considered as appropriate for a successful democracy jurisdictions 
that were large enough to be self-sufficient but small enough that citizens could get to know one 
another (Blom‐Hansen, Houlberg, and Serritzlew 2014; Larsen 2002). It has been pointed out by 
opponents of municipal merger that people lose accessibility to local elected representatives and the 
bureaucracy in larger municipalities (Vojnovic 2000). Such reduction in citizen access may negative-
ly influence citizen interests in politics, political participation, political trust, political efficacy, citizen 
satisfaction, and functions of local councils (Hansen 2015; Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010; 
Steiner and Kaiser 2016; Vojnovic 2000). Thus, opponents of mergers claim that municipal consol-
idation might lead to declines in the quality of local democracy.  
 
Scholars in political science have mainly debated over jurisdiction size and the quality of local de-
mocracy (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Newton 1982; Denters et al. 2014). In the context of this ongoing 
debate, scholars who seek to assess municipal mergers evaluate how mergers influence local de-
mocracy. In doing so, most previous studies have been concerned about how municipal size affects 
individual political behavior and attitudes such as political participation, political competence, con-
fidence in government, and satisfaction with government performance (Denters et al. 2014; New-
ton 1982; Hansen 2015; Larsen 2002; Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz 2016; Lassen and Serritzlew 
2011; Hansen 2013; Steiner and Kaiser 2016). Previous studies generally suggest two competing 
arguments regarding jurisdiction size and political behavior. The first argument claims that munici-
pal size negatively affects individual behavior and attitudes. In small municipalities, citizens have a 
higher sense of community and social cohesion, which leads to more concern about public affairs 
and political participation (Newton 1982). Therefore, increasing the scale of municipal government 
negatively affects individuals’ political orientations and their willingness to be involved in politics 
(Denters et al. 2014). Moreover, smaller municipalities tend to produce local policies that satisfy 
citizen preferences because of the small separation between local officials and citizens and high 
homogeneity, which translate into higher citizen satisfaction with local government (Hansen 2013, 
2015; Mouritzen 1989). On the other hand, the second argument is that municipal size positively 
affects individual political orientations and behavior. Larger municipalities have higher capacities 
and more resources to deliver municipal services more effectively and efficiently. Since larger mu-
nicipalities are able to provide more, citizens are able to control more aspects of their environment 
which in turn leads to more incentives for political participation, stronger political efficacy, and 
greater satisfaction with municipal government (Hansen 2013; Mouritzen 1989). In addition, larger 
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municipalities tend to have more vibrant and diverse associational life, which leads to a more com-
petitive democratic system. In such a competitive system, citizens are more likely to be interested in 
politics (Dahl and Tufte 1973; Denters et al. 2014).  
 
Empirical results seem to support arguments for the negative impacts of municipal size on citizen 
behavior. Hansen (2013) shows that changes in municipal size negatively affect citizens’ trust in 
local politics by using Denmark’s experiences with municipal mergers. Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz 
(2016) show that municipal size reduces political interest, political efficacy, and civic engagement in 
Poland. In his study of Danish municipalities, Hansen (2015) finds that increases in population size 
by municipal mergers have a negative impact on citizen satisfaction on local democracy and local 
services. Likewise, by using the case of municipal merger reform in Denmark, Lassen and Serritz-
lew (2011) find that municipal mergers have negative impacts on citizens’ internal political efficacy. 
While results of these studies seem to generally suggest an inverse relationship between municipal 
size and citizens’ political orientations and participation, there have been very few studies that ex-
amine how mergers affect the performance of local councils. To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen (2010) is the only empirical study that examines merger 
impacts on local councils. However, the purpose of their study is to analyze how changes in juris-
diction size affect local councilors’ perceived influence in policy making by using survey data. There 
is no empirical study that assesses merger impacts on local council performance by using objective 
data.  
 
The question, then, is how do municipal mergers affect the legislative productivity of local coun-
cils? Unfortunately, scholars have not provided a single theory that provides a direct link between 
rescaling of municipal jurisdiction and government and legislative performance. However, drawing 
on existing studies in jurisdiction size, municipal merger, and public management, we identify be-
low several reasons for both positive and negative impacts of municipal mergers on performance. 
Therefore, our aim here is to build a theoretical link between merger of municipalities and council 
performance. First of all, mergers can positively affect performance of the local legislature. The 
primary source for such arguments comes from the concentration of available resources in merged 
municipalities. One of the purposes of merger is to build municipalities with more capacities and 
resources for service provision by consolidating fragmented municipalities. Mergers enable munici-
palities to have more legal power and status and to have more resources (Fox and Gurley-Calvez 
2006). Thus, local councils in larger municipalities may have more available resources such as a 
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professional staff, a larger council budget and greater support for legislative activities. Such en-
hanced resources empower legislatures and enhance their legislative productivity (Ferraz and Finan 
2009; Grissom and Harrington 2013). More professional legislatures are also likely to promote 
more policy diffusion (Shipan and Volden 2006), which also promotes legislative activity.  
 
However, previous studies also suggest reasons to expect negative merger impacts. First, evidence 
from previous studies suggests that mergers reduce citizen interests in politics, internal efficacy, and 
participation(Hansen 2015, 2013; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011), which may in turn reduce respon-
siveness of local leaders to citizens (Denters et al. 2014; Dahl and Tufte 1973). Secondly, municipal 
mergers enlarge the size of population with which local councilors must deal. Compared to the pre-
merger municipality in which local councilors account for a relatively small size of population, local 
councilors in the post-merger municipality need to deal with a larger population and more diverse 
needs of local citizens. In particular, in Japanese municipal settings, local council members are 
elected by the single nontransferable vote rule in a municipality-wide, at-large district with some 
small exceptions (Yamada 2016). This means that local councilors need to represent more voters in 
the post-merger municipalities than in the pre-merger municipalities. Therefore, citizen’s experience 
decreased access to elected councilors in the post-merger municipalities. Such reduction in counci-
lor-citizen proximity may hinder local councilors’ responsiveness. Thirdly, municipal mergers aim at 
building more professional and specialized bureaucracies that cannot be acquired easily by smaller 
municipalities (Dollery, Byrnes, and Crase 2007; Fox and Gurley-Calvez 2006; Carr and Feiock 
1999; Vojnovic 2000). In addition, professionalization of bureaucracies enhances innovation in 
public policy (Teodoro 2009; Bhatti, Olsen, and Pedersen 2011). Furthermore, such advancement 
in the administrative body may increase more specialized administrative casework and reduce 
transparency in administrative process. Therefore, such advancement in the degree of professional-
ization and specialization of administrative bodies may weaken the roles of local legislators (Kjaer, 
Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010).  In other words, local councilors experiencing merger will encoun-
ter increased complexities of administrative work, which hamper a more active role of  councilors 
in the legislative process (Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010). Finally, municipal mergers cause 
profound organizational changes that may cause short-term disruption in organizational perfor-
mance. In merged organizations, it may take time to establish new organizational cultures and 
norms. Organizational managers need to manage employee resistance against such unsettling 
changes and employee stress (Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta 2015). Organizational changes 
may negatively affect employee health and increase stress, which may negatively affect organiza-
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tional performance (Dahl 2011; Takagishi, Sakata, and Kitamura 2012). Our study of Japanese mu-
nicipalities covers a seven-year period (2008-2014) that begins only three years after the peak period 
of merger waves (2005).ii Therefore, because only a short time had elapsed since the bulk of these 
mergers were finalized in Japan, they might be more likely to continue to suffer from these short-
term negative impacts of consolidation. 
 
In sum, in this study we hypothesize that municipal merger discourages legislative performance. 
This hypothesis is based on the reasons given above--which correspond to the arguments empha-
sizing the negative effects of municipal merger--as well as the empirical evidence of the negative 
correlation between municipal size and individual democratic behaviors. We test this hypothesis 
using a dataset of 754 Japanese municipalities. 
 
Case Selection: Japanese Local Governments 
This study uses a case of Japanese municipalities. Japan is a suitable case for analysis for the follow-
ing reasons. First, and most importantly, the Japanese experience of nationwide municipal mergers 
provides ample cases to assess the impact of municipal mergers on legislative performance, cover-
ing all municipalities. Second, Japanese local governments have similar administrative structures 
regardless of their geographic location and municipal size, thus allowing us to control for institu-
tional factors. Furthermore, Japanese regions are less diverse with respect to culture, ethnicity, and 
economy, compared to other developed countries. For instance, regional disparities in unemploy-
ment rate were the lowest, and regional differences in GDP per capita were the fifth lowest among 
OECD countries (OECD 2014). Therefore, such homogeneity helps us to control for other factors 
that may potentially influence our dependent variables. Finally, despite the fact that Japan is an 
advanced democratic country, Japanese local governments have been less studied in the English 
literature of public administration compared to those in Western European and North American 
countries. Examining this understudied setting helps us to build better theories of the municipal 
size-performance relationship and municipal merger, which responds to the recent increasing inter-
est in contextual factors in public management (Meier, Rutherford, and Avellaneda 2017) and com-
parative and international perspectives in public administration (Jreisat 2002; Fitzpatrick et al. 2011; 
Raadschelders and Lee 2011; Jreisat 2005; Hou et al. 2011).  
 
Japan adopted a unitary political and administrative system with a two-tier local government sys-
tem: prefecture as regional government units and municipality as local government units. Munici-
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palities, in turn, are categorized as cities, towns, and villages. As of April 2014, Japan has 47 prefec-
tures and 1,718 municipalities, and of these 790 are cities, 745 are towns, and 183 are villages (MIC 
2014). Although some municipalities have additional responsibilities depending on population size, 
basically all municipalities have the same powers and similar responsibilities such as provisions of 
social relief, nursing insurance; national health insurance, etc(MIC n.d.-a).iii  
 
Japanese local government structure consists of the legislative branch and the executive branch. 
The relationship between the legislative and executive bodies is classified as a “strong mayor” sys-
tem in the United States. The chief executive holds the exclusive power over all executive agencies 
(CLAIR 2013; Kawasaki 2000). Japanese local governments have adopted a presidential system, in 
which both the mayor and the local assembly members are directly elected by voters. The mayor 
and the local assembly are separate and independent entities. Unlike the diversity of local govern-
ment structures in the U.S., this Japanese structure has been adopted uniformly across municipali-
ties (CLAIR, 2013) Mayors’ rights include enacting regulations, preparing budgets, proposing bills, 
and appointing or dismissing staff. Local assemblies have voting rights in matters including budget 
and ordinances, and can conduct a no-confidence vote with respect to mayors.  
 
Japanese local councils have played a surprisingly weak role in legislative performance (Hirose and 
Local Council Reform Forum 2014). Although local councils have rights to establish or amend 
bylaws and revise the mayor’s legislative proposals, it is unusual that local councils play an active 
role as a legislative body. For instance, only 9.6 % of local councils rejected legislation proposed by 
a mayor in 2013. The percentage of local councils that submitted revisions to mayoral proposals 
was only 18.6 % in 2013. Only 11.0 % of local councils submitted a bylaw proposal in the same 
year. Thus, most Japanese local councils largely depend on the strong role of the mayor as a law-
maker and are considered as a rubber stamp for the administrative body (Hirose and Local Council 
Reform Forum 2014). Such passive roles of local councils are due to several factors such as the 
strong mayor system and overregulation of functions and authority of local councils by law 
(Imasato 2005). However, the recent decentralization reform begun-in 1999 has provided local 
councils with more discretionary power. In addition, the passive role of local assemblies has recent-
ly attracted wider public attention. These factors have led to encourage councils to play a more 
active legislative role in municipal policy making.  
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Japanese Municipal Structural Context: Municipal Merger 
Declining birthrate and severe financial conditions are among the drivers that led the Japanese cen-
tral government to promote nationwide consolidation reform (Yokomichi 2007). Municipal mer-
gers were conducted on a voluntary basis. However, the central government set 1,000 as the total 
number of municipalities when all the consolidation was done and asked prefecture/regional gov-
ernments to promote consolidation within their jurisdictions (Yokomichi 2007) by providing strong 
financial and economic incentives. For many municipalities, a major reason for merger was to im-
prove their finances by gaining a larger tax base. For example, municipalities with a large population 
and high per capita revenues were generally less likely to join mergers on account of the financial 
incentives (Yamada, 2016). Once merger was chosen, a merger council was formed comprising 
decision-makers, legislators and residents of the merging municipalities, as required by law. Typical-
ly, agreements on merger were written and signed by the council. The councils were eventually 
dissolved after the mergers were completed (Suzuki and Sakuwa 2016). During the period of the 
Great Heisei Municipal Consolidation, the number of Japanese municipalities decreased from 3,229 
in 1999 to 1,821 in 2006 (Yokomichi 2007), and this number continued to decrease gradually to 
1,718 in 2014 (MIC 2014). 
 
Two types of merger have been adopted: (1) municipal absorption, in which a core municipality 
absorbs other partners; and (2) the creation of a new municipality by merging units (Miyazaki 2014). 
Through absorption, the core municipality retains both its mayor and legal status, while the ab-
sorbed municipalities forego theirs. In many cases, names of core municipalities are maintained, 
and city offices of core municipalities continue to serve as the headquarters for the consolidated 
unit. Newly created municipalities, by contrast, are granted a new legal status, and the comprising 
units have to decide on both a new name and office location for the created municipality (Ehime 
Prefecture n.d.). The same principles generally apply for the composition of the municipal council, 
with members of the core municipality retained in the case of annexation, while with a new munici-
pality, a new council was formed. From April 1999 to April 2014, there were 649 cases of municipal 
consolidation: 461 cases of creation of a new municipality, and 188 cases of municipal absorption. 
 
Data Collection and Variable Operationalization 
The unit of analysis is the municipality-year. We target all city-level municipalities because of data 
availability. Our analysis includes 754 city-level municipalities from 2008 to 2014 in the post-merger 
period.iv As the local council term is four years, the panel dataset covers data from two local coun-
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cil terms. Towns and villages were excluded because of the unavailability of certain variables. Local 
council’s performance data, which is the dependent variable, is obtained from White Paper on Lo-
cal Council Reform 2009-2014 (Hirose and Local Council Reform Forum 2009-2014). This white 
paper, first published in 2009, provides a unique dataset of all Japanese local councils regarding 
their legislative activities based on survey data for councils.v To the best of the authors’ knowledge, 
there is no publicly available dataset that contains all individual local council’s data in the pre-
merger period. Therefore, analysis with a panel dataset that contains both pre-and post-merger 
municipalities is unattainable. The data for municipal merger are from MIC (n.d.-c). Mayoral politi-
cal data are obtained from List of Local Chief Executives (2007-2012 editions) (Chihō Jichi Sōgō 
Kenkyūjo 2007-2012) and Profiles of Governors and Mayors in Japan (2007-2012 editions) (Chiho ̄ 
Gyo ̄zaisei Chōsakai 2007-2012). Independent variables and other control variables are collected 
from MIC (2015b) and Settlement of Municipality Finances (MIC 2014-2015). 
 
Measuring Legislative Performance 
This study focuses on the following two dimensions of legislative activities: legislative proposal and 
approval. In Japan, proposing a bill or requesting an amendment to a proposed bill requires a con-
curring vote of one twelfth or more of all local council members (MIC 2015a). However, approving 
a bill requires a concurring vote of a majority of council members (Nara City Office n.d.). Thus, 
legislative approval requires more votes from council members and needs more coordination ef-
forts among council members. As an object of local council legislation, we particularly look at two 
different types of legislation objects: 1) municipal bylaws and 2) amendments to mayoral proposals. 
With respect to municipal bylaws, we look at a certain type of bylaw: the one addressing policy 
issues within a municipal jurisdiction. Bylaw policy proposals that can directly affect citizens’ life 
and enhance the local council’s ability to check the executive body are typically included in this 
category. Other bylaw proposals that are only related to local council matters such as remuneration 
of councilors, information disclosure of council activities, and organization of the council secretari-
at are excluded (Fukuoka City Council Secretariat 2015).vi We focus on this type of policy bylaw 
because of data availability and, more importantly, it is considered a measurement of legislative 
performance of local councils in Japan (Hirose and Local Council Reform Forum 2014). While a 
municipal bylaw proposal is a measurement that captures local councilors’ ability to make a bill 
independently, amendment bill proposals highlight local councilors’ ability to modify and amend a 
mayor’s bill proposal. The latter requires less effort for local councilors than the former because 
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they do not need to draft a bill from scratch in the latter case. Amendment proposals to any type of 
bill proposed by a mayor are counted.  
 
This study looks at both the legislative proposals and approvals for municipal bylaws and amend-
ments to mayors' proposals. This led us to create four dependent variables: 1) municipal bylaw 
proposal; 2) amendment proposal; 3) bylaw approval; and 4) amendment approval. As explained 
previously, traditionally local councils in Japan play only a passive role as a legislature. However, 
due to several legal and regulatory changes in local council activities by the central government 
since 1999 (MIC 2015a), local councils have received more autonomy and discretionary power. 
That has led to encourage legislative activity at local councils. However, there are still only a small 
number of local councils that are engaged either in legislative proposals or approval of policy by-
laws or amendments as reported in Table 1 & 2.  Due to the small number of local councils that 
actually proposed or approved municipal bylaws or amendments to mayoral bills, we use both di-
chotomous and continuous variables. Specifically, the first type is a dummy variable, which gives 
“1” for those municipalities that submit at least one amendment proposal to mayoral legislation and 
“0” otherwise.  We created a dummy variable for council’s approval of amendment proposals to 
mayoral legislation as well. In addition, we repeated the same procedure to create a dummy variable 
for proposal and approval of municipal bylaws. The second dependent variable is a continuous 
variable, which shows the number of local council’s revision proposals to mayoral legislation. This 
variable is standardized by the number of councilors in each municipality. We repeated the same 
procedure for approval of local council’s amendment proposals to mayoral legislation, proposals of 
bylaws, and approval of bylaws.  
 
Independent Variable  
The most important variable of this study is municipal merger. We use a categorical variable for 
merger, consisting of three groups. The first category is the baseline, denoting the municipalities 
that experienced no merger after 1999. The second category describes whether a municipality has 
experienced any consolidation through absorption. That is, if a locality absorbed at least one munic-
ipality after 1999, it falls within this category. Finally, the third category represents municipalities 
that were created as a new municipality through consolidation of two or more units at any point 
after 1999. We use a categorical variable rather than a binary variable which indicates whether or 
not a merger took place. This is because we expect that merger effects might differ depending on 
merger type. In merger through creation of new municipality, merging partners have equal status 
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and need to establish a new organizational culture, norms, and informal institutions, which require 
more coordination efforts and time. On the other hand, in municipal absorption, larger municipali-
ties in terms of population absorb smaller municipalities, and they tend to remain the central gov-
ernmental entity in merged municipalities.  
 
Control Variables 
This study controls for other factors expected to influence legislative performance. Such factors 
include resources for local councils, political context, and socio-economic conditions. Previous 
studies suggest that legislative productivity depends on available resources for local councils (Ferraz 
and Finan 2009; Grissom and Harrington 2013; Yoon and Jeong 2016). Such resources include 
council budget, salary, legislative staff, hours in committee meeting, and legislative days. In this 
study, we focus on local council’s budget per councilor and councilor’s salary due to the unavaila-
bility of other data. Political controls include 1) mayors’ vote share; 2) number of political parties 
supporting the elected mayor in mayoral elections; and 3) percentage of local councilors that sup-
ported mayors during mayoral elections. Mayors’ vote share is a continuous variable, reported in 
percentage. As many mayoral candidates run without party affiliation, we control for the number of 
political parties that publicly support the elected mayor. It is a continuous variable, ranging from 0 
to 6. The percentage of local councilors supporting mayors is a continuous variable. The first varia-
ble indicates the political power of the mayor and the second and third variables measure an ideo-
logical distance between mayor and local councilors. Higher values for these variables mean that 
mayor-council distance is close, which is expected to discourage legislative initiative by local counci-
lors. We also controlled for socio-economic factors, including population size (logged), unemploy-
ment rate (%), and percentage of senior citizens (%). Finally, we also include a dummy variable for 
each year, leaving year 2008 as the excluded category, namely a base year.  
 
Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables. Table 4 reports the correlations ma-
trix for all the variables. The correlation matrix shows a high correlation between some control 
variables within the same model such as population and local councilor salary (0.74), and popula-
tion and local council budget (0.72), and mayor’s political party support and councilors supporting 
mayor (0.71). However, the variance inflation factors (VIF) for the regression are below 6.69, sug-
gesting that multicollinearity is not an issue in our models. In addition, as a robustness check, we 
rerun the same models without population, which has high correlation with other control variables, 
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to see if we still obtain same results. Local council salary and budget records high correlation, how-
ever, these two variables are not used in the same model.  
 
Empirical Strategy 
The goal of this paper is to estimate any (negative) effects of municipal merger (or municipal mer-
ger type) on local council’s performance by using a panel data of 754 city-level municipalities from 
2008 to 2014 in Japan. Please note that this dataset is a short panel with each municipality (i) having 
7-year time points (t). Please also note also that the main explanatory variable of interest, municipal 
merger, is a categorical variable, which indicates 0 if there is no merger, 1 if a municipality absorbed 
a smaller municipality(ies), and 2 if a new municipality was created through merger. The dependent 
variable measuring legislature performance has two types. One is dichotomous with 1 if a munici-
pality proposed or approved at least one bylaw or amendment, or 0 otherwise.  The other is con-
tinuous, which is measured by the total number of bylaws/amendments proposed or approved that 
is divided for standardization by each municipality’s total number of councilors. Due to these dif-
ferences in the dependent variables, we need to utilize different panel analyses depending on the 
type of dependent variable. For the binary dependent variables, we use random effects (RE) models 
with panel-robust standard errors due to several reasons.vii First, we prefer random errors compo-
nent models to pooled logit models because the binary dependent variable has enough volatility not 
only between variations but also within variation as reported in Table 5. Second, and most im-
portantly, among the random error models, fixed-effects (FE) models are not possible in this study 
since our main explanatory variable of interest, municipal merger, is time-invariant (see Table 5), 
which is automatically excluded from analysis when we run fixed-effects logistic models by using 
xtlogit command with fe option in STATA14.  As a remedy for this issue, even though we cannot 
correct for the unit fixed effects, we tried to control for any regional fixed effects by using prefec-
ture (an administrative jurisdiction higher than municipality in Japan) dummy variables. Thirdly, 
among all the control variables, the local councilor salary per councilor (both in raw or logged val-
ues) and population in logged (which are grayed in table 5) have very small within standard devia-
tion. In other words, for those regressors, most of the variation is between-municipality variation 
rather than within-municipality variation. This implies that FE estimators are not very efficient 
because they rely on within-observation variation(Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 621). In addition, 
short panels are not appropriate for consistently estimating FE models in some standard non-linear 
models such as binary probit(Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 615). Lastly, the binary dependent varia-
bles are considerably persistent from year to year as in Table 6. For example, 91.4% of municipali-
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ties who did not propose any bylaws one year also did not propose any bylaws the next year while 
only 37.3% of those who proposed a bylaw one year also did the next. This asymmetric persistence 
is applied to other dependent variables such as revision proposed, bylaw approved, and revision 
approved. Furthermore, correlations in the dependent variables vary little with lag lengths as shown 
in Table 7. Therefore, we need to correct for error correlation over time for a given unit, that is, in 
our case, the municipality. In sum, given these reasons and the fact that pre-merger data is not 
available, the most appropriate model among the non-linear panel models should be RE models 
with panel-robust standard errors. 
 
We conduct three types of robustness check. We run the same models 1) using local council budg-
et/ councilor instead of local council salary/ councilor as a control variable; 2) adding regional 
fixed-effects; and 3) dropping a variable of high correlation (population). Population variable has a 
high correlation with local council salary or budget, therefor we run the same models without 
population in order to see whether or not we obtain the same results.  
 
Analysis and Results 
Table 8 reports results of random-effects logit models with a panel-level variance component. Pan-
el-robust standard errors are calculated by using the vce(bootstrap) option in STATA, following Cam-
eron & Trivedi’s(Cameron and Trivedi 2010, 623) recommendation. The rho, which is measuring 
the fraction of total variance due to the panel-level variance component or the within variation, is 
statistically significant (P-value < 0.001).  For example, among the total variance in bylaw proposal, 
25.7% is due to the panel-level variance component, which is statistically significant from the result 
of the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test on rho=0. When rho is zero, the panel-level variance component 
is unimportant and the panel estimator such as the RE model is not different from the pooled es-
timator such as the pooled logit one. Therefore, the significance of rho is evidence that an RE 
model is more appropriate than a pooled model.  
 
Table 8 shows that the municipalities merged through absorption or creation significantly decrease 
the log odds ratio of proposing bylaws by 0.396 (P-value < 0.05) or 0.776 (P-value <0.001) respec-
tively, compared to non-merged municipalities. Also, municipalities merged through absorption 
significantly decrease the log odds ratio of proposing or approving amendments by 0.42 (P-value 
<0.05) or 0.510 (P-value <0.05) respectively, compared to those unmerged. However, municipali-
ties merged through creation of a new municipality do not show statistically significant difference 
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from those unmerged in terms of amendment proposal or approval, or bylaw approval.  Among the 
control variables, population size (logged) is the most important and significant factor positively 
affecting legislative performance, ranging from 0.366 for amendment approval to 0.75 for bylaw 
proposal. For sensitivity checks on these results, we additionally estimated the same models by 
changing a control variable or considering a regional-fixed effect. Appendix 1 displays the results 
with local council budget, rather than local council salary. Appendix 2 conveys the results with re-
gional-fixed effects. Municipalities merged through the creation of a new municipality still record a 
significant negative effect on bylaw proposal even if the magnitudes are decreased. Furthermore, 
we reran the same models dropping the population variable, which causes high correlation with 
local council salary or budget. However, the results in Appendix 3 do not differ from those from 
the main models. These results show the robustness of our results. 
 
Finally, Figure 2 shows the predicted probability of average councilor’s legislative activity by merger 
type with 95% Confidence Interval (CI).  Noticeably, only municipal merger through new creation 
significantly decreases average councilor’s probability of proposing bylaw by 5% from 11% (non-
merged) to 6% (new creation). viii 
 
Regarding the continuous dependent variables, we chose a panel tobit model. This is because big 
portions of their values are zero as seen in Figure 1. Table 5 shows that the continuous dependent 
variables have within and between variations with similar magnitude except bylaw approv-
al/councilor. A random-effects panel tobit model was estimated by xttobit with re option in STATA. 
We fit a panel tobit model for legislative performances on merger type and various controls includ-
ing year-fixed effects. The only available panel estimator is xttobit with re option since a panel tobit 
with fixed effects is not applicable (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010, p. 631). Table 9 conveys the results 
from the RE panel tobit models. Note that sigma_u, the estimated standard deviation for the RE 
portion or within variation, is statistically significant. This implies that an RE tobit model is more 
appropriate than a pooled one. The fraction of total variance contributed by the within variance, 
rho, ranges from 12% (bylaw approval) to 37.8% (amendment approval). Table 8 shows that mu-
nicipalities merged through the creation of a new municipality significantly decrease legislative per-
formance by 0.036 (p-value< 0.001). It also reports that merged municipalities through absorption 
record lower performance of amendment proposal by 0.026 (p-value < 0.05) and amendment ap-
proval by 0.031 (p-value<0.05). This means that local councilors in the municipalities that experi-
enced merger through new municipality creation perform lower than those in non-merged munici-
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palities when assessed by bylaw proposals as well as proposal and approval of amendment bills. 
Size of population in log is also the most significant effect on municipal legislative activity, as in 
cases of the binary dependent variables. We repeated the same procedures for robustness check and 
find that the main results do not significantly change (see Appendix 4-6).  
 
Discussions and Limitations 
This study assesses how municipal merger affects legislative performance by using a dataset of 754 
Japanese city-level governments from 2008 to 2014.  We hypothesized that municipal merger dis-
courages performance of legislative activity by local councils. Results suggest that municipal merger 
is negatively associated with bylaw proposals by councils.  Local councils experiencing municipal 
merger propose fewer municipal bylaws.  This result supports our hypothesis.   
 
More specifically, the results suggest that only the effect of merger through creation of new munic-
ipality, not merger through absorption, is statistically significant.  This might be because the former 
may require more coordination efforts among merger partners than the latter. In the case of munic-
ipal absorption, one central municipality absorbs other small municipalities. Typically, the new unit 
does acquire a new name, but preserves the name of larger municipality.  Organizational culture 
and the norms of the larger municipality and local council may tend to dominate in cases where 
smaller municipalities are absorbed.  On the other hand, in the case of mergers through the creation 
of a new municipality, merger partners need more effort to coordinate in establishing procedures, 
norms, and organizational culture in merged municipalities. Therefore, such differences in efforts 
required to manage municipalities after merger may affect differences in outcomes. 
 
The results also suggest that only bylaw proposal achieves statistically significant results, not revi-
sion proposal, bylaw approval, and revision approval. Regarding the difference between proposal 
and approval, as explained previously, the number of bylaw or revision approvals per council is 
notably smaller than that of bylaw or revision proposals, respectively.  Also, the number of munici-
palities who approve at least one bylaw or revision is notably smaller bylaw or revision is notably 
smaller than that of municipalities who propose at least one bylaw or revision, respectively. Table 4 
shows these different distributions in binary as well as continuous where the mean and standard 
deviation of bylaw or revision approvals are lower than those of bylaw or revision proposals, re-
spectively.  Such lack of variation may have led to the result. With respect to bylaw and revision, 
there are differences in discretion of local councilors between them.  Local councilors can have 
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more initiative in the proposal of bylaws because they do not require recommendation or approval 
of mayors for the councilors to do so. On the other hand, whether or not local councilors propose 
revisions to mayors' proposals for bylaws depends on the quality of the proposals and other factors 
that affect mayor-council relations.  If local councilors are satisfied with the bylaw proposed by the 
mayor, they do not necessarily propose revisions.  Furthermore, if a mayor and local councilors 
belong to the same political party, local councilors may have less incentive for submitting a revision 
proposal. Therefore, such gaps in discretion of local councilors may have affected the differences in 
our results. 
 
The finding of our study is in line with studies that report negative impacts of jurisdiction size on 
citizens’ political behavior (Hansen 2013; Gendźwiłł and Swianiewicz 2016; Hansen 2015; Lassen 
and Serritzlew 2011) and influence of local councilors (Kjaer, Hjelmar, and Leth Olsen 2010). Our 
study shows that enlarging municipal size through merger is also negatively associated with other 
dimension of local democracy: legislative performance. Municipal mergers have been carried out in 
many developed countries. However, their drawbacks, especially from a perspective local democra-
cy, have not been fully considered by policy makers. Results of this study imply that politicians and 
policy makers should consider such potential negative impacts of administrative reforms on local 
democracy. Our study is not without limitations. Our study mainly focuses on short-term impacts 
of municipal merger as our dataset covers a seven-year period (2008-2014), which begins only three 
years after the peak period of merger reform (2005). The effects of municipal mergers on local 
democracy might differ if we include more time period in the analysis. Furthermore, data unavaila-
bility impedes us from comparing legislative performance in the pre-merger municipalities with one 
in the post-merger municipalities. While we control for several factors that are likely to affect our 
dependent variables, we may have omitted other factors that simultaneously could affect both mer-
ger and the dependent variables. These weaknesses should be further compensated for by further 
data collection efforts through municipal surveys and testing the external validity in other contexts 
and countries.  
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i
 See OECD (2014) and Suzuki (2016). 
ii
 There was 1 merger case in 1999, 2 in 2000, 3 in 2001, 6, in 2002, 30 in 2003, 215 in 2004, 325 in 2005, 12 in 2006, 6 
in 2007, 12 in 2008, 30 in 2009, 6 in 2011, and 1 in 2014(MIC n.d.-b).  
iii
 Municipalities provide services which include social relief; the establishment and management of nursing homes for 
the elderly; elementary and middle schools; nursing insurance; national health insurance; urban design; construction 
and management of municipal roads, bridges, water, and sewerage; collection and disposal of general waste; fire-
fighting operations; medical emergency support; and resident registration (MIC, n.d.-a). 
iv
 46 municipalities that experienced merger after 2007 are dropped from our sample. The boundaries of the municipali-
ties that experienced merger during the period of our dataset (2007-2012) are not identical before and after the merger. 
Such inconsistency in the unit of analysis during our dataset period makes these municipalities less comparable across 
time. 
v
 The white paper is published by a group of scholars and practitioners that promote reform of local councils. 
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vi
 For instance, bylaw policy proposals address policy issues such as preventing damage caused by the collapse of an 
abandoned house, securing public transportation means for elderly citizens and people with disabilities, and penalizing 
street solicitation for adult entertainment shops (Fukuoka City Council Secretariat, 2015). 
vii
 Note that non-linear panel models, unlike linear panel models, cannot apply model specification tests such as BP 
(Breusch and Pagan), LM test for random errors model vs. Pooled logits, or modified Wald test for groupwise het-
eroskedasticity. 
viii
 Please note the predicted probabilities are computed when the merger type changes from 0 (non-merged) through 1 
(absorption) to 2 (new creation), by setting all other variables at means.  Please note that this prediction might be un-
derestimated since within variations are set as 0 (α_i=0), which can be a non-representative evaluation point. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLES 
 
 
TABLE 1, LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY PER YEAR: PROPOSAL 
 
Number of Municipalities 
 
 
  Bylaws 
Amendments 
year 0 ≥1 0 ≥1 
2008 635 65 564 138 
  (90.7) (9.3) (80.3) (19.7) 
2009 651 75 517 209 
  (89.67) (10.33) (71.21) (28.79) 
2010 674 78 517 235 
  (89.63) (10.37) (68.75) (31.25) 
2011 661 81 534 205 
  (89.08) (10.92) (72.26) (27.74) 
2012 654 83 553 194 
  (88.74) (11.26) (74.03) (25.97) 
2013 629 105 543 189 
  (85.69) (14.31) (74.18) (25.82) 
2014 633 100 560 175 
  (86.36) (13.64) (76.19) (23.81) 
Total 4,537 587 3,788 1345 
  (88.54) (11.46) (73.80) (26.20) 
( ) %     
 
 
TABLE 2, LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY PER YEAR: APPROVAL 
 
Number of Municipalities 
 
 
  Bylaws Amendments 
year 0 ≥1 0 ≥1 
2008 677 24 626 76 
  (96.6) (3.4) (89.2) (10.8) 
2009 694 32 612 114 
  (95.59) (4.41) (84.30) (15.70) 
2010 725 27 622 128 
  (96.41) (3.59) (82.93) (17.07) 
2011 704 38 593 101 
  (94.88) (5.12) (85.45) (14.55) 
2012 696 43 653 94 
  (94.18) (5.82) (87.42) (12.58) 
2013 627 63 599 98 
  (90.87) (9.13) (85.94) (14.06) 
2014 639 64 622 87 
  (90.90) (9.10) (87.73) (12.27) 
Total 4,762 291 4,327 698 
  (94.24) (5.76) (86.11) (13.89) 
( ) %     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3, DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables (dummy) 
    Bylaw Proposal   0.11 0.32 0 1 
Amendment Proposal  0.26 0.44 0 1 
Bylaw Approval   0.06 0.23 0 1 
Amendment Approval  0.14 0.35 0 1 
Dependent Variables (continuous)     
Bylaw Proposal/councilor  0.01 0.03 0 0.59 
Amendment Proposal/councilor   0.02 0.05 0 0.65 
Bylaw Approval/councilor   0.00 0.01 0 0.18 
Amendment Approval/councilor  0.01 0.03 0 0.63 
     
Independent Variable 
    Municipal merger  
(0: no merger, 1: absorption,  
2: new municipality)  0.86 0.92 0 2 
     
Controls 
    
Local councilor salary/councilor  6866.92 2237.73 1506.75 23,913.04  
Local council budget /councilor 12,331.45  4,308.98  4473.556 37,097.32  
Mayors' vote share (%) 59.23 25.06 0 100 
Mayor's political party support 0.92 1.27 0 6 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 8.16 15.61 0 88.09 
Population  139683 254503 3823 3,644,429  
Unemployment rate (%) 6.36 1.67 2.4 18.20 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 24.35 5.45 9.1 43.80 
Year dummy (baseline=2008) 3.02 1.99 0 6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4, CORRELATION MATRIX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
1 Bylaw Proposal Dummy  1                                   
2 Amendment Proposal Dummy  0.13 1                                 
3 Bylaw Approval Dummy  0.69 0.07 1                               
4 Amendment Approval Dummy  0.03 0.66 0.06 1                             
5 Bylaw Proposal/councilor  0.73 0.14 0.40 0.01 1                           
6 Amendment Proposal/councilor   0.08 0.69 0.06 0.56 0.08 1                         
7 Bylaw Approval/councilor   0.62 0.07 0.90 0.07 0.44 0.07 1                       
8 Amendment Approval/councilor  0.01 0.47 0.04 0.71 0.01 0.75 0.05 1                     
9 Municipal merger -0.14 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1                   
10 Local councilor salary/councilor  0.30 0.10 0.18 0.03 0.21 0.02 0.09 -0.02 -0.38 1                 
11 Local council budget /councilor 0.31 0.11 0.19 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.37 0.91 1               
12 Mayors' vote share (%) -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 1             
13 Mayor's political party support 0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.09 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.19 0.32 0.28 0.09 1           
14 Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.21 0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.23 0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.26 0.49 0.47 0.04 0.71 1         
15 Population  0.29 0.09 0.24 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.11 -0.01 -0.16 0.74 0.72 -0.04 0.17 0.31 1       
16 Unemployment rate (%) -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.11 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 1     
17 Percentage of senior citizens (%) -0.13 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.37 -0.48 -0.42 0.00 -0.25 -0.29 -0.27 0.09 1   
18 Year dummy (baseline=2008) 0.04 0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.18 -0.30 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.16 0.19 1 
TABLE 5, PANEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS      
 
Variable   
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Dependent Variables (dummy) 
 
      
 Bylaw Proposal   overall 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 N = 5124.0 
 
between 
 
0.19 0.00 1.00 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.25 -0.74 0.97 T-bar = 6.8 
Amendment Proposal  overall 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 N = 5133.0 
 
between 
 
0.26 0.00 1.00 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.35 -0.60 1.12 T-bar = 6.8 
Bylaw Approval   overall 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 N = 5053.0 
 
between 
 
0.11 0.00 0.86 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.21 -0.80 0.91 T-bar = 6.7 
Amendment Approval  overall 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 N = 5025.0 
 
between 
 
0.20 0.00 1.00 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.28 -0.72 1.00 T-bar = 6.7 
Dependent Variables (Continuous) 
        
Bylaw Proposal/councilor  overall 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.59 N = 5110.0 
 
between 
 
0.02 0.00 0.24 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.02 -0.23 0.41 T-bar = 6.8 
Amendment Proposal/councilor   overall 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.65 N = 5119.0 
 
between 
 
0.03 0.00 0.21 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.04 -0.15 0.57 T-bar = 6.8 
Bylaw Approval/councilor   overall 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.18 N = 5039.0 
 
between 
 
0.00 0.00 0.03 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.01 -0.03 0.16 T-bar = 6.7 
Amendment Approval/councilor  overall 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.63 N = 5013.0 
 
between 
 
0.02 0.00 0.15 n = 754.0 
  within   0.03 -0.14 0.53 T-bar = 6.6 
Independent Variable  
 
      
 
Municipal merger  overall 0.86 0.92 0.00 2.00 N = 5278.0 
  between   0.92 0.00 2.00 n = 754.0 
  within   0.00 0.86 0.86 T = 7.0 
Controls 
 
      
 
Local councilor salary/councilor  overall 6840.83 2224.31 1506.75 23913.04 N = 5264.0 
  between   2190.61 2701.73 22894.70 n = 754.0 
  within   396.77 3574.43 12948.79 T-bar = 7.0 
Local councilor salary/councilor (ln) overall 8.79 0.29 7.32 10.08 N = 5264.0 
  between   0.29 7.90 10.04 n = 754.0 
  within   0.05 7.97 9.28 T-bar = 7.0 
Local council budget /councilor overall 12270.67 4288.99 4473.56 37097.32 N = 5264.0 
 
between 
 
4069.31 5285.87 33535.86 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
1370.15 6668.72 25966.15 T-bar = 7.0 
Mayors' vote share (%) overall 59.28 25.06 0.00 100.00 N = 5271.0 
 
between 
 
12.21 26.65 95.74 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
21.89 -22.42 123.70 T-bar = 7.0 
Mayor's political party support overall 0.91 1.26 0.00 6.00 N = 5274.0 
 
between 
 
1.04 0.00 4.86 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.71 -2.52 5.19 T-bar = 7.0 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) overall 8.00 15.43 0.00 88.09 N = 5278.0 
 
between 
 
13.82 0.00 85.93 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
6.89 -48.25 71.62 T = 7.0 
Population (ln) overall 11.29 0.90 8.25 15.11 N = 5278.0 
  between   0.90 8.36 15.10 n = 754.0 
  within   0.02 11.18 11.40 T = 7.0 
Unemployment rate (%) overall 6.37 1.68 2.40 18.20 N = 5278.0 
 
between 
 
1.59 2.54 17.17 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
0.54 2.80 8.23 T = 7.0 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) overall 24.34 5.43 9.10 43.80 N = 5278.0 
 
between 
 
5.25 10.96 42.63 n = 754.0 
 
within 
 
1.41 19.48 26.28 T = 7.0 
Year dummy (baseline=2008) overall 3.00 2.00 0.00 6.00 N = 5278.0 
 
between 
 
0.00 3.00 3.00 n = 754.0 
  within   2.00 0.00 6.00 T = 7.0 
 
  
 TABLE 6, YEAR-TO-YEAR TRANSITIONS IN COUNCILOR ACTIVITY 
  Bylaw Proposed 
Bylaw Proposed 
0 1 
0 
91.4 8.6 
1 
62.7 37.3 
   
  Amendment Proposed 
Amendment Proposed 
0 1 
0 
80.6 19.4 
1 
51.0 49.0 
   
  Bylaw Approved 
Bylaw Approved 
0 1 
0 
94.6 5.4 
1 
80.5 19.6 
   
  Amendment Approved 
Amendment Approved 
0 1 
0 
89.2 10.8 
1 
63.7 36.4 
 
  
 
 
 
TABLE 7, CORRELATIONS IN DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Bylaw Proposed 
0 L1 L2 L3 L4 
0 1.00 
   
  
L1 0.25 1.00 
  
  
L2 0.28 0.30 1.00 
 
  
L3 0.27 0.29 0.33 1.00   
L4 0.23 0.27 0.31 0.32 1.00 
      
Amendment Proposed 
0 L1 L2 L3 L4 
0 1.00 
   
  
L1 0.31 1.00 
  
  
L2 0.27 0.29 1.00 
 
  
L3 0.23 0.25 0.27 1.00   
L4 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.27 1.00 
      
Bylaw Approved 
0 L1 L2 L3 L4 
0 1.00 
   
  
L1 0.14 1.00 
  
  
L2 0.12 0.17 1.00 
 
  
L3 0.09 0.09 0.15 1.00   
L4 0.04 0.05 0.08 0.08 1.00 
      
Amendment Approved 
0 L1 L2 L3 L4 
0 1.00 
   
  
L1 0.26 1.00 
  
  
L2 0.29 0.23 1.00 
 
  
L3 0.22 0.25 0.25 1.00   
L4 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.26 1.00 
  
TABLE 8, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (DUMMY VARIABLE: XTLOGIT MODEL) 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  
M1 M2 M3 M4 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
 
  
  Municipal absorption  -0.396* -0.420* 0.036 -0.510* 
  
(0.175) (0.170) (0.201) (0.209) 
New municipality -0.776*** -0.108 -0.257 0.014 
  
(0.178) (0.169) (0.202) (0.167) 
Controls 
 
  
  
Local councilor salary (ln) 0.573 -0.035 1.126* -0.097 
  
(0.510) (0.370) (0.541) (0.474) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.009*** -0.004* -0.008** -0.005* 
  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mayor's political party support -0.223** -0.161* -0.041 0.008 
  
(0.073) (0.070) (0.084) (0.107) 
Councilors supporting mayor(%) 0.0195** 0.0131* -0.0157* -0.0219* 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) 
Population (ln) 0.753*** 0.385** 0.550** 0.366* 
  
(0.171) (0.120) (0.182) (0.168) 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.028 0.017 0.031 0.028 
  
(0.018) (0.011) (0.021) (0.021) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.086 -0.016 -0.0936* 0.012 
  
(0.051) (0.043) (0.039) (0.042) 
Constant -15.88*** -5.869** -19.32*** -6.244 
  
(3.133) (2.234) (3.468) (3.215) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
lnsig2u 0.129 0.583*** -0.607 0.773*** 
  (0.178) (0.089) (0.360) (0.117) 
rho 0.257***+ 0.353***+ 0.142***+ 0.397***+ 
  (0.034) (0.020) (0.044) (0.028) 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
AIC 3055.1 5339.7 2023.7 3686.3 
BIC 3166.3 5450.9 2134.6 3797.2 
( )  Bootstrap Standard Error, using vce(bootstrap) in Stata 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
+ LR test of rho=0 
 
  
TABLE 9, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (CONTINUOUS VARIABLE: TOBIT MODEL) 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
 
  
M1 M2 M3 M4 
 
Independent variables:  
(baseline=No merger) 
 
  
   
Municipal absorption  -0.017 -0.026* 0.002 -0.031* 
 
  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) 
 
New municipality -0.036*** -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 
 
  
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
 
Controls 
 
  
  
 
Local councilor salary (ln) 0.043 0.009 0.052** 0.007 
 
  
(0.022) (0.021) (0.019) (0.026) 
 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0003* 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Mayor's political party support -0.011** -0.005 -0.003 0.002 
 
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.001*** 0.000 -0.0005 -0.001*** 
 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Population (ln) 0.025*** 0.009 0.013* 0.010 
 
  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009) 
 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 
 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 
 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
Constant -0.778*** -0.278* -0.733***  -0.343 
 
  
(0.152) (0.141) (0.128) (0.178) 
 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
sigma_u 0.058*** 0.072***  0.029**  0.082*** 
 
sigma_e 0.091*** 0.097***  0.078***  0.106*** 
 
rho 0.288 0.355 0.120 0.378 
 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
 
AIC 926.7 933.0 747.0 1314.0 
 
BIC 1044.4 1050.7 864.5 1431.3 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
     
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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FIGURE 1, HISTOGRAMS OF CONTINUOUS DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
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FIGURE 2, PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF AVERAGE COUNCILOR’S ACTIVITY BY MERGER TYPE WITH 95% 
CI 
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APPENDIX 
 
APPENDIX 1, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (DUMMY VARIABLE: XTLOGIT MODEL) 
USING LOCAL COUNCIL BUDGET 
 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  M1 M2 M3 M4 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
 
  
  Municipal absorption  -0.354 -0.365 0.097 -0.395 
  (0.231) (0.207) (0.195) (0.253) 
New municipality -0.725*** -0.013 -0.207 0.225 
  (0.209) (0.196) (0.206) (0.156) 
Controls 
 
  
  
Local council budget/councilor (ln) 0.0001 0.000 0.0001** 0.0001* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.009** -0.004* -0.008** -0.005* 
  (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Mayor's political party support -0.215** -0.156 -0.027 0.021 
  (0.078) (0.087) (0.086) (0.090) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.019** 0.012 -0.017* -0.025** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
Population (ln) 0.624*** 0.209 0.365* -0.032 
  (0.176) (0.152) (0.174) (0.167) 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.023 0.013 0.022 0.018 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.085 -0.017 -0.0923* 0.011 
  (0.048) (0.041) (0.040) (0.058) 
Constant -9.993*** -4.606** -8.256*** -3.498 
  (1.972) (1.685) (1.754) (1.887) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
lnsig2u 0.126 0.586***  -0.747* 0.748*** 
  (0.229) (0.113) (0.345) (0.130) 
rho 0.256***+ 0.353***+ 0.126***+ 0.391***+ 
  (0.044) (0.113) (0.038) (0.031) 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
AIC 3055.1 5339.7 2023.7 3686.3 
BIC 3166.3 5450.9 2134.6 3797.2 
( )  Bootstrap Standard Error, using vce(bootstrap) in Stata 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
+ LR test of rho=0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (BINARY VARIABLE: XTLOGIT MODEL) WITH REGION-FIXED EFFECTS 
 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  M1 M1-1 M2 M2-1 M3 M3-1 M4 M4-1 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
   
  
    Municipal absorption  -0.052 -0.030 -0.207 -0.192 0.169 0.225 -0.362 -0.306 
  (0.208) (0.212) (0.226) (0.229) (0.206) (0.198) (0.258) (0.261) 
New municipality -0.590** -0.528** 0.004 0.081 -0.085 -0.049 -0.014 0.181 
  (0.206) (0.205) (0.167) (0.167) (0.199) (0.191) (0.196) (0.200) 
Controls 
   
  
    
Local councilor salary (ln) -0.056 
 
-0.489   1.258 
 
-0.576 
 
  (0.674) 
 
(0.475)   (0.779) 
 
(0.556) 
 
Local council budget/councilor (ln) 
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.0001** 
 
0.0001 
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.008** -0.008** -0.005* -0.005* 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Mayor's political party support -0.231** -0.225** -0.179** -0.176** -0.110 -0.088 -0.035 -0.019 
  (0.081) (0.082) (0.067) (0.067) (0.082) (0.083) (0.088) (0.088) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.014 0.013 0.014* 0.014* -0.006 -0.008 -0.017 -0.019* 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population (ln) 0.853*** 0.711*** 0.409** 0.257 0.476* 0.287 0.464* 0.043 
  (0.192) (0.201) (0.143) (0.156) (0.236) (0.201) (0.182) (0.196) 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.034 0.032 0.010 0.009 0.021 0.012 0.032 0.025 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.038 -0.035 -0.062 -0.062 -0.062 -0.055 -0.097 -0.093 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.045) (0.045) (0.059) (0.057) (0.055) (0.054) 
Constant -11.84** -11.06*** -1.888 -4.574** -19.26***   -7.143** -2.681 -3.731 
  
(4.299) (2.130) (3.206) (1.702) (4.550) (2.212) (3.692) (2.146) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
lnsig2u -0.077 -0.086 0.291* 0.298** -1.422 -1.785 0.494***  0.481*** 
  (0.189) (0.191) (0.115) (0.115) (0.765) (1.186) (0.131) (0.133) 
rho 0.220 0.218 0.289 0.290 0.068 0.049 0.333 0.330 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.024) (0.049) (0.055) (0.029) (0.029) 
N 5106 5106 5115 5115 4930 4930 4929 4929 
AIC 3089.7 3089.0 5313.2 5314.2 2055.2 2052.0 3673.8 3671.8 
BIC 3501.6 3500.9 5725.2 5726.2 2451.9 2448.6 4070.5 4068.5 
( )  Robust Standard Error, using vce(robust) in Stata 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (DUMMY VARIABLE: XTLOGIT MODEL) WITHOUT 
POPULATION VARIABLE 
 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  
M1 M2 M3 M4 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
 
  
  
Municipal absorption  -0.094 -0.262 0.249 -0.358 
  
(0.198) (0.204) (0.188) (0.310) 
New municipality -0.488** 0.027 -0.044 0.143 
  
(0.158) (0.158) (0.219) (0.161) 
Controls: 
 
  
  
Local councilor salary (ln) 2.471*** 0.807** 2.606*** 0.703* 
  
(0.273) (0.309) (0.361) (0.292) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.009*** -0.004* -0.009** -0.005* 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mayor's political party support -0.236** -0.168* -0.054 0.002 
  
(0.080) (0.069) (0.093) (0.088) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.021** 0.014* -0.014* -0.021* 
  
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Population (ln) 
 
  
  
   
  
  
Percentage of senior citizens (%) -0.002 0.000 0.009 0.011 
  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.090* -0.019 -0.095* 0.010 
  
(0.045) (0.035) (0.041) (0.046) 
Constant -23.54*** -8.603** -25.79*** -8.842** 
  
(2.411) (2.915) (3.434) (2.769) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
lnsig2u 0.176 0.588***   -0.425 0.777*** 
  (0.132) (0.098) (0.354) (0.135) 
rho 0.256***+ 0.354***+ 0.166***+ 0.398***+ 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.049) (0.032) 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
AIC 3080.9 5346.1 2035.1 3689.6 
BIC 3185.5 5450.7 2139.4 3793.9 
( )  Bootstrap Standard Error, using vce(bootstrap) in Stata 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
+ LR test of rho=0 
 
  
 APPENDIX 4, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (CONTINUOUS VARIABLE: TOBIT MODEL) USING 
LOCAL COUNCIL BUDGET 
 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  
M1 M2 M3 M4 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
 
  
  
Municipal absorption  -0.014 -0.023* 0.004 -0.025 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) 
New municipality -0.033*** -0.008 -0.007 0.006 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) 
Controls 
 
  
  
Local council budget/councilor (ln) 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mayor's political party support -0.011** -0.005 -0.003 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population (ln) 0.018* 0.000 0.009 -0.011 
  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011) 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.004 -0.001 -0.003 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -0.357*** -0.123 -0.262***  ' -0.102 
  (0.090) (0.089) (0.073) (0.114) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sigma_u 0.058*** 0.072***  0.028*** 0.081*** 
sigma_e 0.091*** 0.097***  0.079***  0.106*** 
rho 0.287 0.355 0.110 0.372 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
AIC 924.2 930.4 746.4 1307.4 
BIC 1041.9 1048.1 863.9 1424.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
    
 
APPENDIX 5, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (CONTINUOUS VARIABLE: TOBIT MODEL) WITH REGION-FIXED EFFECTS 
  DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  M1 M1-1 M2 M2-1 M3 M3-1 M4 M4-1 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger)         
Municipal absorption  -0.002 0.000 -0.013 -0.012 0.007 0.009 -0.022 -0.019 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
New municipality -0.028** -0.025* -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 0.004 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Controls 
   
  
    
Local councilor salary (ln) 0.018 
 
-0.014   0.0561* 
 
-0.019 
 
  (0.027) 
 
(0.024)   (0.022) 
 
(0.030) 
 
Local council budget/councilor (ln) 
 
0.000  
 
0.000  
 
0.000** 
 
0.000  
  
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.0004** -0.0004** 0.000 0.000 -0.0003** -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0003* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mayor's political party support -0.011** -0.011** -0.006* -0.006* -0.006 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.001* 0.001* 0.0004 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.001** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population (ln) 0.029*** 0.0216* 0.010 0.003 0.010 0.007 0.016 -0.006 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) 
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant -0.618***  -0.412*** -0.0798 -0.133 -0.727*** -0.230** -0.157 -0.120 
  (0.182) (0.096) (0.162) (0.091) (0.151) (0.079) (0.206) (0.117) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sigma_u 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.063***  0.063***  0.022*** 0.021***  0.072***  0.071**** 
sigma_e 0.091***  0.091*** 0.097***  0.097*** 0.078***  0.076***  0.106***  0.106*** 
rho 0.257 0.257 0.296 0.297 0.075 0.067 0.314 0.312 
N 5106 5106 5115 5115 5035 5035 5009 5009 
AIC 966.7 964.9 911.1 911.1 785.8 785.5 1304.7 1301.3 
BIC 1385.1 1383.4 1329.7 1329.7 1203.3 1203.1 1721.9 1718.5 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
APPENDIX 6, EXPLAINING LEGISLATIVE PERFORMANCE: 2008-2014 (CONTINUOUS VARIABLE: TOBIT 
MODEL) WITHOUT POPULATION VARIABLE 
 
  
 DV: Legislative Proposal DV: Legislative Approval 
  
Bylaw Amendment Bylaw Amendment 
  
M1 M2 M3 M4 
Independent variables: (baseline=No merger) 
 
  
  
Municipal absorption  -0.007 -0.022* 0.007 -0.027 
  
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) 
New municipality -0.027** -0.010 -0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) 
Controls: 
 
  
  
Local councilor salary (ln) 0.104*** 0.028* 0.086*** 0.029 
  
(0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018) 
Mayors' vote share (%) -0.0004*** -0.0002 -0.0003** -0.0003* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mayor's political party support -0.011** -0.005 -0.003 0.002 
  
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Councilors supporting mayor (%) 0.001*** 0.000 -0.0005 -0.001*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Population (ln) 
 
  
  
   
  
  
Percentage of senior citizens (%) 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.000 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constant -1.011*** -0.338* -0.877*** -0.414* 
  
(0.140) (0.132) (0.117) (0.168) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
sigma_u 0.058*** 0.072***  0.030*** 0.082*** 
sigma_e 0.091*** 0.097***  0.078*** 0.106*** 
rho 0.290 0.353 0.130 0.378 
N 5106 5115 5035 5009 
AIC 937.2 932.6 750.8 1313.3 
BIC 1048.4 1043.8 861.7 1424.1 
Standard errors in parentheses 
    
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
     
